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This paper compares the efficiency of cooperatives and private enterprises in 
the Portuguese wine industry, employing data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
The use of DEA for the analysis of comparative efficiency within a sector is 
a key tool in evaluating organizational competitiveness. Competitiveness 
should be based on benchmarking the different types of organizations that 
comprise the viniculture sector. We conclude that Portuguese wine 
cooperatives, on average, are more efficient than their private counterparts. 
Economic implications arising from the study are discussed.  
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The main purpose of this paper is to apply a relatively new approach to comparing 
the efficiency of private enterprises and cooperatives operating in the same market. 
The paper compares the efficiency of private firms with cooperatives in wine- 
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making industry in order to determine which organizational form is more efficient. 
The comparison of different organizations is a benchmarking procedure, which is a 
key issue in economics because competitiveness depends on efficiency. The 
motivation for the present research is based on theoretical arguments relating to the 
organization and the industry of which it is a part. The industrial-organization view 
argues that industrial factors are the primary determinants of a firm’s performance 
(Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980), while the resource-based view argues that the 
enterprise’s internal environment drives competitive advantage (Schumalensee, 
1985; Rumelt, 1991). The industrial organization view on performance is based on 
its measurement at the industry level. However, analysis at the industry level lends 
support to the resource-based views. If organizations in the same industry, facing 
identical conditions of supply and demand and operating within the same market 
structure, perform differently, then resource-heterogeneity among the organizations 
in the industry is the reason for the differences in results reported in the literature. 
Research into these competing views in fact reveals strong support for the 
resource-based view. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned theoretical arguments, we investigate 
whether cooperatives are less or more efficient than private enterprises by 
performing a sector benchmark analysis of the Portuguese wine producers. We 
compare cooperatives with private enterprises using financial data for the period 
1996–2000 obtained from Dunn & Bradstreet. The research on this issue lends 
support to the view that cooperatives are the more efficient units in the same 
market (Singh et al., 2001; Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton, 1990; Lerman and 
Parliament, 1990). Despite the relative importance of this topic, there is a paucity 
of research involving comparisons between different forms of ownership operating 
within the same sector. 
  The paper is organized as follows. We start with the contextual setting 
describing the Portuguese wine market in order to establish the framework of the 
analysis; then we survey the existing literature in order to clarify the contribution 
which this paper makes with regard to the subject area; this is followed by an 
explanation of the theoretical framework that underpins the model, a description of 
the data used, and the results of analysis; the following section compares the 
efficiency scores of cooperatives and private enterprises, which leads to a 





The production of wine in Portugal ranks the country in 5
th place among the 
European wine-producing countries and 11
th at the world level (ICEP, 2003). Since Comparing the Productive Efficiency of Cooperatives and Private Enterprises  111
Portugal’s accession to the EU, the industry has benefited from strong investment 
in up-to-date production techniques and technology, bringing about substantial 
improvement in the quality of its wines. The importance of the sector to the 
national economy is reflected in the fact that 9% of all agricultural land is devoted 
to wine production. Approximately half of the estates are smallholdings, with no 
more than 2 hectares.  
The Portuguese wine market is highly competitive and is composed of many 
organizations, including small, medium, and large private companies as well as 
cooperatives. The latter account for at least 30% of production and sales. They are 
represented in the lower- and middle-quality range and exist throughout the 
country. The high-quality range is controlled by private enterprises. The wine 
produced by cooperatives is the product of the small landowner-farmers, who 
deliver their grapes to the cooperative for processing, distribution, and sale. The 
private enterprises usually have the means to produce their wine themselves. 
However, some private enterprises buy the grapes of small independent farmers on 
the market and process them into wine, then bottle and sell the production. 
 
Table 1. Wine Industry in Portugal in 2001 
 
Type 




Storage 1,320  15.5 
Distillers 604  7.1 
Bottlers 984  11.5 
Exporters and importers  833  9.8 
Wine vinegar producers  8  0.1 
Wine sellers without premises  76  0.9 
Wine-cellar keepers  130  1.5 
Wine producers  1,353  15.9 
Vine cultivators  2,700  31.6 
Vine cultivators and bottlers   527  6.2 
Total 8,535  100 
Source: Instituto da Vinha e do Vinho 
 
In 2000, Portuguese wine production, including fortified port and madeira, 
amounted to more than 6 million hectolitres. Of this, 2 million hectolitres were 
exported (ICEP, 2003). The main export markets in 2000 for the fortified wines 
were France, followed by Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Germany, and 
USA. The principal importers of table wines were, in descending order, Spain, 
Angola, France, UK, Germany, Brazil, USA, Sweden, Denmark and Canada.  
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The geographical distribution of the production is organized in several wine 
regions. The Oporto region in the north and, to a lesser extent, the Alentejo region 
in the centre of the country are the most important on the basis of their production.  
In 2001, there were 8,535 wine enterprises registered with the regulatory body, 
the Instituto da Vinha e do Vinho, and of these 16% were wine producers. Table 1 
shows the numbers of registered wine industry organizations by type. It can be 
observed that the largest category is composed of small farmers who are engaged 
solely in the cultivation and harvesting of grapevines, before delivering them to 





There is a relative paucity of research into the productive efficiency of different 
types of organizations. Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton (1990) and Lerman and 
Parliament (1990) used financial ratios to compare the efficiency of cooperatives 
with competing forms of ownership in the same market. Other empirical studies in 
this line of research include Powell (1996), and more recently Singh et al. (2001), 
who investigated the comparative efficiency of cooperatives using the frontier 
model.  
In this paper, we compare the productive efficiency within a sole industry. We 
do not consider industry effects, but only organizational unit factors, specifically 
between cooperatives and private enterprises that compete in the same market. Our 





In this study, productive efficiency is determined by data envelopment analysis 
(DEA). Following Farrell (1957), Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) first 
introduced the term data envelopment analysis (DEA) to describe a mathematical 
programming approach to the construction of production frontiers and the 
measurement of efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers. They proposed a 
model that had an input orientation and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). 
Later studies have considered alternative sets of assumptions. Banker, Charnes, 
and Cooper (1984) first introduced the assumption of variable returns to scale 
(VRS).  Since the model is well established and extensively applied in the 
literature, its discussion is limited to a brief description. For more details on model 
development, see Fare, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994); Charnes et al. (1995); 
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The two scientific methods that quantitatively analyze efficiency, namely the 
non-parametric DEA and the econometric Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), both 
have their advantages and drawbacks. Unlike the econometric stochastic frontier 
approach, the DEA allows the use of multiple outputs. Moreover, since the DEA 
frontier is estimated with a non-parametric methodology, there is no need to 
impose any functional form on the data or to make any distributional assumptions 
for the inefficiency term. 
Both methods assume that the production function of the fully-efficient 
decision-making unit is known. In practice, this is not the case and the efficient 
isoquant must be estimated from the sample data. Under these conditions, the 
frontier is constructed relative to the sample considered in the analysis. 
DEA is applied to the assessment of homogeneous units, such as wine 
producers. The unit of assessment is normally referred to as a decision-making unit 
(DMU). A DMU converts inputs into outputs. The identification of the inputs and 
outputs in an assessment is as difficult as it is crucial. The literature, data 
availability, and managers’ subjective opinions all play a role in the selection of 
inputs and outputs. In this paper, the availability of the data drives our choice of 
the inputs and outputs used in the analysis.  
In the programming method, DEA “floats” a piecewise linear surface to rest on 
top of the observations (Seiford and Thrall, 1990, p.8). The facets of the 
hyperplane define the efficiency frontier and the degree of inefficiency is 
quantified by a series of metrics that measure the distances from the hyperplane 
and its facets.  
The general-purpose DEA developed by Charnes et al. (1978) considers n 
DMUs (j = 1,…, n) using k inputs to secure m outputs. For DMU i, the k inputs 
form the vector xi  and the m outputs form the vector yi.  Intuitively, we would like 
to rank the firms by the ratio of all outputs to all inputs u’yi/v’xi, where u is the 
vector of output weights, v is the vector of input weights. In practice, the ratio is 
replaced with n differences for all DUMs (subject to the constraint v’xi = 1), and,  
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This is the multiplier form of the linear programming model. Applying the 
duality principle, we pass to the equivalent envelopment form of the problem, 


























Here X is the k × n matrix of inputs, Y is the m × n matrix of outputs,  λ is a n ×1 
vector of constants (unknown), and θ  is a sought scalar (it represents the efficiency 
score of DMU i). For a given set of feasible λ values, the left-hand sides of the 
input- and output-related constraints specify a production point within the 
production possibility set (the envelopment hyperplane). The model seeks a point 
in the production possibility set which offers at least the output levels of DMU i  
while using as low a proportion of its input levels as possible.  
The value of θ  obtained in this way is the (CRS) efficiency score of DMU i. 
The dual problem is solved n times to obtain the efficiency score θ for each of the 
n DMUs. It satisfies θ  ≤ 1, with θ  = 1 corresponding to a technically efficient 
point on the production frontier; points with θ  < 1 lie inside the production frontier 
and are technically inefficient.  
The CRS problem (2) is modified to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS) 
by adding a single constraint N1′λ = 1, where N1 is the n × 1 vector of 1s. This 
convexity constraint produces a convex hull of intersecting planes that envelop the 
data points more tightly than the CRS hyperplane, so that the VRS technical 





To estimate the production frontier, we used panel data for the period 1996-2000 
from 27 wine enterprises, of which 7 were cooperatives. The dataset contained a 
total of 135 observations. The data were obtained from the Dunn & Bradstreet 
database of financial reports of enterprises and therefore consisted of financial 
variables. All the monetary values were deflated by the GDP deflator and 
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Output was measured by three financial indicators: sales, value of production, 
and gross value added (GVA). When choosing the inputs of the DMUs, we in 
principle have to distinguish between controllable and uncontrollable factors. 
However, in this study only controllable factors – labor and capital – were 
available. We accordingly measured inputs by four indicators: labor was measured 
by the number of workers (full-time equivalents) and by the cost of labor; capital 
was measured by the book value of the physical assets and by amortization. All 
inputs and outputs were used simultaneously in the DEA model. This characteristic 
of DEA to handle simultaneously multiple inputs and multiple outputs is one of its 
strongest advantages compared with econometric cost or production frontier 
models. The combination of indicators used in our analysis satisfied the DEA 
convention that the minimum number of DMUs be greater than three times the 
number of inputs plus outputs: 5×27 ≥ 3×(3+4) (Raab and Lichty, 2002). 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the inputs and outputs 
Variables Units  Min  Max  Mean  St.  dev. 
Sales Euros  1,000  38,684  35,070  61,517 
Production Euros  1,150  35,360  33,590  55,219 
Gross value added   Euros  17  110,322  10,242  18,671 
Cost of labor  Euros  121  33,799  23,902  6,447 
Full-time workers  Number  4  416  90  101 
Physical assets (book value)  Euros  241  390,068  43,505  68,385 
Amortization Euros  27,353  51,009  48,981  20,623 
Source: Dan & Bradstreet database of financial reports.  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. There was high 
heterogeneity among the enterprises in the sample, as is evident from the fact that 
the value of the standard deviation is higher than the mean for most variables. 
 
 
Technical Efficiency Results 
 
The DEA index can be calculated in several ways. In this study, we estimated an 
output-oriented technical efficiency (TE) DEA index, since we are analyzing a 
competitive market. The hypothesis of variable returns to scale (VRS) was chosen 
because firm size is a paramount issue in any market. The VRS scores measure 
pure technical efficiency only. The constant-return-to-scale (CRS) model estimates 
the overall efficient scores (Charnes et al., 1995).  The ratio of overall efficiency 
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scores (CRS) to pure technical efficiency scores (VRS) provides a scale-efficiency 
measure.  
A wine organization is output-oriented Pareto-efficient if it is not possible to 
raise any of its output levels without lowering at least another of its output levels, 
or without increasing at least one of its input levels. The output-oriented technical 
efficiency of a wine producer is the inverse of the maximum factor by which its 
output levels could be jointly (“radially”) expanded without raising any of its input 
levels. 
Table 3 presents the technical efficiency scores of the wine organizations 
(private enterprises and cooperatives) from the Dunn & Bradstreet database, which 
constitute a representative sample of the Portuguese wine enterprises. The rankings 
are ordered from the most efficient to the least efficient according to the VRS 
hypothesis. Six DMUs have the maximum technical efficiency of 1 by VRS scores. 
By overall efficiency (CRS scores), on the other hand, the DEA index is equal to 1 
only for two DMUs. All CRS-efficient DMUs are also efficient when VRS is 
assumed, signifying that the dominant source of inefficiency is due to scale 
economies. The average efficiency score under CRS is equal to 0.423, including all 
sources of inefficiency. Thus, the wine organizations could improve their output by 
57.7% while maintaining the same input values. The efficiency scores under VRS 
are higher (0.697) and the loss of output due to inappropriate use of resources – 
given the scale of operation – is 30.3%. The wine producers are thus observed to 
be more efficient in managing their resources when the scale of operation is taken 
into account. 
 
Table 3. DEA Technical Efficiency Scores for Portuguese Wine Enterprises, 
1996-2000 
 Name  Organizational 
form 
CRS VRS Scale 
efficiency 
1  Adega Cooperativa de São 
Mamede da Ventosa, C.R.L. 
Cooperative 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2  Adega Cooperativa de 
Mesão Frio, C.R.L.  
Cooperative 1.000 1.000 1.000 
3  Caves Aliança, S.A.   Private firm  0.409  1.000  0.409 
4  Sandeman & CA, S.A.   Private firm  0.348  1.000  0.348 
5  Companhia Geral da 
Agricultura das Vinhas do 
Alto Douro, S.A.  
Private firm  0.305  1.000  0.305 
6  Sogrape – Vinhos de 
Portugal, S.A. 
Private firm  0.277  1.000  0.277 
7  Barros, Almeida & CA – 
Vinhos, S.A. 
Private firm  0.386  0.942  0.409 Comparing the Productive Efficiency of Cooperatives and Private Enterprises  117
Table 3 (continued) 
 
 Name  Organizational 
form 
CRS VRS Scale 
efficiency 
8  Adriano Ramos Pinto, S.A.  Private firm  0.394  0.922  0.427 
9  Real Companhia vinícola do 
Norte de Portugal, S.A.  
Private firm  0.615  0.883  0.697 
10  Cooperativa Vitivinícola do 
Peso da Régua, Caves vale 
de Rodo, C.R.L.  
Cooperative 0.519 0.864 0.601 
11  Aveleda – Sociedade 
Agrícola e Comercial da 
Quinta da Aveleda, S.A. 
Private firm  0.301  0.803  0.374 
12  José Maria da Fonseca Sucrs, 
Vinhos, S.A.  
Private firm  0.326  0.782  0.417 
13  Adega Cooperativa De 
Murça, C.R.L. 
Cooperative 0.641 0.741 0.865 
14  Sociedade Dos Vinhos 
Borges, S.A. 
Private firm  0.212  0.674  0.314 
15  Manoel D.Poças Júnior – 
Vinhos, S. A. 
Private firm  0.372  0.652  0.571 
16  A.A.Calem & Filho, S.A.   Private firm  0.255  0.642  0.397 
17  Santos, L.D.A.  Private firm  0.620  0.631  0.983 
18  Sociedade Agrícola e 
Comercial Dos Vinhos 
Messias, S.A.  
Private firm  0.267  0.623  0.429 
19  Adega Cooperativa de 
Arruda dos Vinhos, C.R.L.  
Cooperative 0.502 0.601 0.835 
20  Caves Primavera, L.D.A.   Private firm  0.380  0.544  0.699 
21  Adega Cooperativa de Ponte 
da Barca, C.R.L.  
Cooperative 0.528 0.533 0.990 
22  Caves Moura Basto, S.A.   Private firm  0.446  0.465  0.959 
23  Adega Cooperativa da 
Covilhã, C.R.L. 
Cooperative 0.406 0.424 0.957 
24  Caves da Cerca, S.A.  Private firm  0.289  0.311  0.928 
25  Vallegre – Vinhos do Porto, 
S.A. 
Private firm  0.279  0.279  0.998 
26  Caves Neto Costa, S.A.  Private firm  0.214  0.259  0.825 
27  C.N. Kopke & CA, L.D.A.   Private firm  0.141  0.254  0.556 
Mean value    0.423  0.697  0.651 
Mean for cooperatives    0.657  0.738  0.893 
Mean for private enterprises    0.341  0.683  0.566 
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Comparing Cooperatives and Private Firms 
 
Having established the efficiency rankings of the Portuguese wine companies, we 
proceed to test the following hypothesis regarding the relative efficiency of 
cooperatives and private firms.  
Hypothesis: Wine cooperatives are less efficient than private wine firms.  
The hypothesis is suggested by theoretical considerations based on strategic 
and behavioral differences between cooperatives and private firms in the same 
industry (for more details see, e.g., Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton (1990); 
Lerman and Parliament (1990)). Differences in organizational incentives may play 
a role in the differentiation of cooperatives and private enterprises (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), although in certain settings market competition may equalize 
performance between cooperatives and private firms, hiding the impact of different 
governance structure.  
Contrary to the hypothesis, Portuguese wine cooperatives tend to have higher 
efficiency scores than the privately owned firms (see the means for cooperatives 
and private firms in Table 3). The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test shows that 
the difference in efficiency scores is statistically significant at the 10% level for 
both CRS and VRS scores (the Mann-Whitney test is recommended for the 
analysis of DEA scores by Brockett and Golany (1996) and Grosskopf and 
Valdamanis (1987)). The test thus rejects the hypothesis and suggest that 
cooperatives are more efficient than private enterprises in the Portuguese wine 
market. This result partially supports previous findings for cooperatives in the 
same sector of activity, viz., Singh et al. (2001), Parliament, Lerman, and Fulton 
(1990), and Lerman and Parliament (1990). However, this result should be 




Economic Implications of the Study 
 
A number of points emerge from the present study. First, according to our analysis, 
cooperatives demonstrate greater efficiency than the privately owned firms, with 
two cooperatives at the top of the ranking and the others in the middle of the range. 
The fact that, under VRS, the most efficient units are two cooperatives (Adega 
Cooperativa de São Mamede da Ventosa, C.R.L. and Adega Cooperativa de Mesão 
Frio, C.R.L.) signifies that, contrary to the theoretical hypothesis, the cooperative 
type of organization can achieve high efficiency levels acting in the same market 
as private enterprises. While this result lends support to the importance of 
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differences in resources, in the form of such factors as wine quality, management 
team, and distribution networks, may induce cooperatives to achieve higher 
efficiency than private enterprises acting in the same market (Rumelt, 1991). Good 
resources are a precondition for enterprises to display efficiency in a given market. 
In this context we should note that the Portuguese wine cooperatives enjoy better 
access to resources than private wine producers. The reasons for this are found in 
the historic roots of Portuguese rural cooperatives in general and wine cooperatives 
in particular. They were created as associations of small and medium-sized 
individual farmers in the mid-twentieth century, at a time when the number of 
private wine producers was small. The members of wine cooperative grow their 
grapes in good soil and, with the advantages gained by access to established 
distribution networks, their grapes easily reach the market.  
 In this context, unique assets are seen as exhibiting inherently differentiated 
levels of efficiency; sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets 
owned and controlled by the wine company, whether it is a cooperative or a private 
firm (Teece et al., 1997).  In addition, the  strategic-groups theory (Caves and 
Porter, 1977), which justifies different efficiency scores on the grounds of 
differences in the structural characteristics of units within an industry, explains part 
of the efficiency differences observed in the Portuguese wine industry.  
Second, location is a factor contributing to explaining the efficiency, with 
organizations located in the more highly-regarded wine regions rated as more 
efficient than those in less prestigious regions, reflecting reputation effects. For 
example, the two highest ranking cooperatives in Table 3 are located respectively. 
in Torres Vedras, near Lisbon, a traditional wine region close to the main market 
(No. 1, Adega de São Mamede da Ventosa), and in the Douro valley, the 
prestigious port region (No. 2, Adega de Mesão Frio). 
 
Table 4. DEA results for Adega Cooperativa de Murça, C.R.L. 






Sales 28,321  2.321  523  28,846 
Production 27,375  1.178  0  27,376 
Gross value added   8,372  2.532  0  8,374 
Cost of labor  16,931  0  -2931  14,000 
Full-time workers  83  0  -5  78 
Physical assets (book value)  38,218  0  -11321  26,897 
Amortization 17,173  0  0  17,173 
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Third, although DEA identifies inefficient wine organizations in the sample, it does 
not identify the cause of the inefficiency beyond scale. DEA identifies the slacks 
for the inefficient organizations and gives to each a reference set (peer group) 
which allows for specific recommendations to improve efficiency. Adjustments 
can be determined in terms of output and input slacks that allow inefficient 
organizations to move to the efficient frontier.  For example, Table 4 shows the 
slacks for the outputs and the inputs of Adega Cooperativa de Murça, C.R.L. (No. 
13 in Table 3). Among the three outputs, sales is the only output with a slack, and 
it can be increased to the projected value. Among inputs there are slacks in cost of 
labor, the number of full time workers, and the value of physical assets, signifying 
that these inputs are used in an inefficient way by the cooperative. The use of 
inputs with slacks can be reduced and the outputs with slacks can be increased until 
the DMU reaches the efficiency frontier. 
How do the present findings compare with those of Singh et al. (2001)? First, 
the two papers adopt different methods, therefore a clear comparison is not 
possible. However, both papers support of organizational importance in 
cooperative efficiency, which means that efficiency is determined by internal 
factors specific to the organizations, alongside structural characteristics of units 
within an industry. Moreover, the organizational differences (cooperatives vs. 
private enterprises) are possible reasons behind the observed differences in 
efficiency scores alongside the result of Singh et al. (2001), in which the 
cooperatives similarly displayed a higher level of efficiency. In the present paper, 
some, but not all of the cooperatives have been found to have greater efficiency 
than the private enterprises, and therefore, the Mann-Whitney test has a low 
statistical power.  
Considering the results, the economic implications of this study are as follows: 
firstly, we conclude that the Portuguese wine cooperatives are more efficient than 
the wine private enterprises. Based on this inference, the leading Portuguese wine 
cooperatives should maintain their relative level of efficiency, while the less 
efficient cooperatives should upgrade their efficiency and second, wine 
cooperatives should benchmark their performance against their private 
counterparts, and vice versa, in order for the entire industry to upgrade its 
efficiency along the time. This exercise would enable the under-performing 
organizations to adopt appropriate, effective managerial procedures to overcome 
their deficiencies.  
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Conclusions 
 
This article proposes a simple framework for comparative efficiency evaluation of 
wine organizations (private enterprises and cooperatives). The analysis is based on 
a DEA model that allows for the incorporation of multiple inputs and multiple 
outputs in determining the relative efficiencies. Benchmarks are provided for 
improving the operations of poorly-performing units. Several interesting and useful 
managerial insights and implications from the study are discussed. The general 
conclusion is that, on average, the Portuguese wine cooperatives are more efficient 
than their privately-owned counterparts. For the non-efficient units, we have 
identified peer groups among the efficient cooperatives and the slacks that they 
should adjust in order to achieve the efficient frontier. The result suggests that 
resources, scale economies, and organizational structure (cooperatives vs. private 
firms) are major factors in determining a unit’s efficiency. More investigation is 
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